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Rolf H. Weber, Zurich / Switzerland
 
 
Privacy Impact Assessment – A Privacy Protection Improvement Model? 
 
Abstract:  A  Privacy  Impact  Assessment  (PIA)  is  a  systematic  risk  assessment  tool,  enabling 
organizations to maintain compliance with data protection regulations, to manage privacy risks and to 
provide  public  benefits  through  the  success  of  privacy-by-design  efforts.  An  actual  practical 
implementation  of  a  PIA  framework  has  been  realized  in  the  context  of  RFID  applications 
encompassing detailed steps for the PIA process; a first successful review has been completed. The 
PIA  also  allows  to  introduce  a  pro-active  mitigation  of  privacy  risks  through  technical  and 
organizational controls. The better the precautionary measures realize the relevant privacy objectives, 
the less likely will occur with the PIA process afterwards. The recent proposal for a far-reaching 
revision of the EU Data Protection Directive envisages to state a specific requirement to implement a 
PIA process. Indeed, since risks for privacy and non-disclosure of personal data are different in not 
identical circumstances, the protection measures should also be different, i.e. technology should assist 
in trying to achieve the (at least) second-best solution for the implementation of the data protection 
regime by a PIA. Insofar, privacy rules can be individualized and matched with the concrete needs in 
the given environment.   
Keywords: Code-based regulation, Data Protection Directive, PIA process, PIA taxonomy, privacy-
by-design, RFID applications, risk assessment, risk design, self-regulation 
 
1. Introduction 
Ten years ago, Jonathan Zittrain summarized the political economy of privacy: “With privacy, 
worry  has  come  largely  from  individuals  seeking  protection  against  a  whittling  away  of 
privacy by well-organized corporate interests.”
1 In his seminal work “CODE version 2.0” 
Lawrence Lessig addresses the problem solving mechanisms of privacy by stating that the 
interests  threatened  would  be  diffuse  and  disorganized,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
values of protection (security, combating cybercrime) would be compelling.
2 
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The term “privacy” has successfully defied at giving it a precise meaning.
3 On the one 
hand, privacy inevitably varies from society to society;
4 therefore, the existing rules show a 
patch-work of different provisions. On the other hand, privacy conveys a large number of 
concepts and ideas.
5 Generally looking, three basic features of privacy can be distinguished, 
namely (i) secrecy, i.e. information known about an individual, (ii) solitude, i.e. access to an 
individual, and (iii) anonymity, i.e. attention paid to an individual.
6 Concepts of privacy can 
be rooted in human dignity, breach of confidence relating to proprietary rights, and protection 
of individual autonomy from state interference.
7 
The law in the field of privacy is confronted with the problem that the Internet has 
overcome  geographical  boundaries;  this  fact  causes  the  risk  that  the  ethnographical 
uniqueness of society-driven privacy rules leads to a disparate picture of protection levels. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, a geographically-based regulatory approach can hardly cope with 
the requirements of an adequate online protection regime;
8  other models, not exclusively 
based  on  legal  rules,  need  to  be  considered  in  building  a  framework  of  protection  in 
consideration of the available technological means. Hereinafter, su ch a new approach, the 
Privacy  Impact  Assessment  (PIA),  executed  by  the  concerned  organization(s)  will  be 
discussed, i.e. an organizationally-based approach which eventually could overcome some 
weaknesses of the present legal framework. An appropriate assessment of the subject matter, 
however, needs to be embedded into the available set of regulatory models. 
 
2. Regulatory Models for the Implementation of a Privacy Concept 
Legislative  actions  in  the  privacy  field  can  be  taken  at  different  levels.  Apart  from  the 
(theoretical) possibility of no regulation at all, the choice is principally between the traditional 
national legislation, the international agreements incl. similar legal instruments and the self-
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regulatory  approach.  In  addition,  related  to  the  online  world,  the  model  of  a  code-based 
approach has been developed. 
The  traditional  national  legislation  is  confronted  with  the  major  disadvantage  of  the 
limited  scope  due  to  the  territoriality  principle:
9  Domestic  rules  “only”  apply  within  the 
boundaries of the concerned country (at least as long as an extraterritorial effect of the law is 
not envisaged) and have the consequence that a harmonized level of privacy protection cannot 
be achieved. Consequently, as it is the case today, national provisions in the privacy field 
request  from  da-ta-exporting  persons  and  enterprises  to  comply  with  the  principle  of  a 
comparable level of protection abroad.
10 
From a theoretical point of view, a transnational approach is inevitable in the online 
world.
11  Nevertheless, the development and implementation of internationally harmonized 
rules is hardly possible if societal perceptions vary so widely as in the case of privacy; since 
customary law can also not be built on the basis of diverging understandings of privacy, a 
successful harmonization of rules is not likely to happen. Therefore, internationally binding 
agreements related to privacy merely exist on a regional level (for example within the 
European Union). Other legal instruments only have non-binding character (being the case for 
the UN-  and the OECD-Guidelines related to data protection). Fundamental freedoms in 
human rights conventions often encompass the right to privacy, but the principles are usually 
worded  in  a  relatively  vague  way  which  makes  their  practical  enforce ability  doubtful. 
Nevertheless, even if not all desirable principles work out as envisaged, experience with 
transnational  law  proves  that  global  problems  can  be  tackled  by  the  international 
community,
12 which obviously means that the community should strengthen the efforts to 
negotiate and conclude additional treaties.
13 
Self-regulation  follows  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  meaning  that  government 
intervention should only take place if participants of a specific community are not able to find 
suitable solutions (structures, behaviors) themselves; since, however, public law defines the 
contours of private law, it contains aspects of the role of self -regulatory mechanisms.
14 The 
legitimacy of self-regulation lies in the fact that private incentives lead to a need-driven rule-
setting process. A major advantage of self-regulation can be seen in the possibility to develop 
and establish rules independent of the principle of territoriality; other strengths are the  
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efficiency  in  responding  to  real  needs  and  mirroring  the  technology,  the  openness  for  a 
permanent  consultation  process  and  for  a  timely  adaption  of  rules  in  case  of  changing 
technologies, as well as the existence of incentives for compliance with a “self-given” legal 
framework.
15  Disadvantages of self-regulation, however, should not be overlooked: The 
quality of the “legislative” process can hardly be judged under the angle of a democratic 
participation (problem of outsider), “private norms” are not generally binding in legal terms, 
self-regulatory mechanisms are not always stable, and – in particular – this kind of legal 
framework does hardly know enforcement procedures leading to sanctions in case of non-
compliance.
16 
In the light of a perceived dissatisfaction with the available regulatory models, Lawrence 
Les-sig developed a new, more technically -oriented approach, the so -called  “code-based 
regulation”, for the online world some 10 years ago.
17 According to Lessig, human behavior 
is  regulated  by  a  complex  interrelation  between  four  forces,  namely  law,  markets,  social 
norms  and  architecture.
18  Code  solutions,  similar  to  legal  rules,  principally  reflect 
“information”  that  allocates  and  enforces  entitlements.  The  design  of  the  code  materially 
influences human behavior since architecture is one of the four regulators; depending on the 
architecture certain activities will be possible or difficult to carry out.
19 Therefore, Lessig 
arrives at a world in which code can do much of “the work that the law used to do far more 
effectively than the law did.”
20 Consequently, effective regulatory power shifts from law to 
code  based  on  an  effective  architectural  framework.
21  Lessig’s  approach  that  relates  the 
code/architecture to the control paradigm has not remained uncontested: For example, the 
aspect of established control structures has  a political impact; furthermore, courts impose 
checks  on  the  powers  of  private  regulators  where  such  regulation  threatens  important 
collective values.
22 
The below discussed Privacy Impact Assess ment draws on two or even three of the 
described  regulatory  models:  Technical  designs  are  the  basis  for  implementing  privacy 
standards, self-regulatory provisions give the legal framework for the establishment of the 
rule-setting mechanisms and some general surveillance functions for compliance purposes are 
laid down in an at least regionally binding legal instrument. This combination of technical and 
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legal  sources  helps  realizing  the  successful  implementation  of  an  adequate  privacy 
environment’s framework. 
 
3. Elements of a Privacy Impact Assessment 
3.1 Notion and Benefits 
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is generally regarded as a systematic risk assessment tool 
that can be usefully integrated into a decision-making process, evaluating a proposal in term 
of impact on personal data privacy with the objective of avoiding or minimizing adverse 
effects.
23 A PIA offers the data users an “early warning” system since privacy problems might 
be identified and detected prior to the implementation of certain systems. 
The benefits in conducting a PIA encompass the possibility (i) to establish and maintain 
compliance with privacy and data protection laws and regulations, (ii) to manage privacy risks 
within an organization and in relation to third persons, and (iii) to provide public benefits 
through the success of privacy-by-design efforts.
24 In addition, a PIA is useful in enabling to 
adequately consider the impact of an action on personal data privacy, directly addressing the 
privacy problems in the process, providing solutions or safeguards at the design stage and 
benchmarking for future privacy compliance audit and control, being a cost-effective way of 
reducing privacy risks as well as providing a credible source of information to allay any 
privacy concerns from the public and the stakeholders.
25 
Apart from the below thoroughly discussed (a nd most detailed) PIA related to RFID 
applications within the European Union, other authorities have also issued general leaflets and 
guidelines
26 or have dealt with the PIA in connection with specific issues such as public 
security
27 or e-government.
28 
 
3.2 Example of RFID 
An  extensive  and  still  ongoing  PIA  project  concerns  the  Radio  Frequency  Identification 
(RFID) applications. On May 12, 2009, the European Commission issued a Recommendation 
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(PIA), July 2010, 1, online available at: http://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/publications/files/PIAleaflet_e.pdf; see 
also Australian Government, Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC), Privacy Impact Assessment Guide, 
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26 For example PCPD Hong Kong (note 23) and Australian OPC (note 23). 
27 See US Department of Homeland Security, State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, Privacy Impact 
Assessment, December 11, 2008, online available at:  
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on the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by 
RFID.
29 This Recommendation should become the basis for developing a framework related 
to privacy impact assessments by the industry, in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders, 
and supervised by the Article 29 Data Protection   Working Party.
30  On March 31, 2010, 
industry representatives delivered a PIA framework proposal which has been reviewed and 
partly rejected for improvement by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. The second 
proposal has then been approved on February 11, 2011.
31 In April 2011, the “inauguration” of 
the PIA framework on RFID applications was formally enacted and in November 2011 a first 
review of the actual implementation has taken place. 
 
In the understanding of the EU authorities the PIA should be designed on the basis of the 
following taxonomy:
32  
 
•  The PIA is to be introduced as a process making the assessment of privacy impacts of 
certain activities a conscious and systematic effort. 
•  The framework should identify the objectives of the (RFID) applications as well as the 
common structure and content of such applications. 
•  A PIA report must be made available documenting the PIA process and addressing the 
review steps of its implementation. 
•  PIA templates  may be  developed based on the framework to provide  industry-based, 
application-based, or other specific formats for PIA processes. 
 
According to the relevant documentation, the PIA process related to RFID applications is 
constructed in two phases:
33 
 
•  A pre-assessment phase classifying the RFID applications according to a four level scale, 
based on a decision tree. 
•  A risk assessment phase, broken down in four main steps, namely (i) characterization of 
the application (data types, data flows, RFID technology, data storage and transfers, etc.), 
(ii) identification of the risks to personal data and evaluation of the threats (likelihood and 
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potential  impact),  (iii)  identification  and  recommendation  of  controls,  in  response  to 
previously identified risks, and (iv) documentation of the results of the PIA process (incl. 
conditions for review and information concerning residual risks). 
 
Furthermore, the relevant documentation requests the PIA application operators to establish 
their own internal procedures in view of supporting the execution of the PIA processes, en-
compassing for example the following steps:
34 
 
•  Scheduling of the PIA process in order to plan the necessary executions and adjustments 
in time and in compliance with industry requests and the supervision by the competent 
authorities; 
•  Internal review of the PIA process (incl. the initial analysis) and of the PIA reports in 
view  of  the  compliance  with  the  applicable  documentation  and  the  factual 
implementation of the relevant measures; 
•  Compilation  of  supporting  artifacts  (for  example  results  of  security  reviews,  control 
designs) as evidence that the processes are executed in a proper way; 
•  Determination  of  the  persons  and/or  functions  within  the  organization  who  have  the 
authority for relevant actions during the PIA process; 
•  Provision of criteria of how to evaluate and document whether the actual applications are 
ready for deployment consistent with the PIA framework and any relevant PIA template; 
•  Consideration/identification of factors that would require a new or revised PIA process, 
for  example  due  to  significant  changes  in  the  applications,  failures  in  the  processes, 
weaknesses in implementation measures, etc. 
•  Stakeholder consultation in order to receive the appropriate feedback from all directly or 
indirectly involved persons/organizations/authorities and, thereupon to be in a position of 
improving the PIA process. 
 
If issues or even problems occur, a specific corrective action plan needs to be developed; 
relevant  risks  identified  should  be  appropriately  mitigated  in  order  to  assure  that  no 
significant residual risks remain and a new PIA might have to be executed.
35 
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3.3 Risk Design Issues 
The objective of a risk assessment is to identify the privacy risks caused by specific processes 
or applications; the discussed RFID applications are a new technological tool, but may only 
serve as an example since privacy risks occur in virtually every business and in government. 
Therefore, the development of an adequate and appropriate risk design is crucial. 
 
In the context of a PIA, privacy risks are to be concretely identified. Notwithstanding the fact 
that each industry or business is confronted with some specific privacy risks it seems to be 
possible to list “critical factors” which might be applicable in virtually all market segments. 
On that note, the following privacy risks should be taken into consideration:
36  
 
•  No data collections for unspecified and unlimited data collections; 
•  No data collections exceeding their purpose; 
•  Avoidance of incomplete information and lack of transparency; 
•  No combinations of data collections exceeding the given purpose of collection; 
•  Lack of erasure policies or mechanisms; 
•  Avoidance of invalid explicit consent to data collection (for example threat); 
•  No secrete data collection; 
•  Avoidance of a situation of inability to grant access; 
•  No technical/operational measures preventing objections by data subjects; 
•  Lack of transparency of automated individual decisions; 
•  Insufficient access right management; 
•  Insufficient authentication mechanisms; 
•  Illegitimate data processing; 
•  Insufficient logging mechanisms; 
•  Uncontrollable data gathering. 
 
Seen from the angle of the data subject, the relevant factors of privacy risks which are to be 
taken into account encompass (i) the functions and activities of the data users, (ii) the nature 
of the personal data involved, (iii) the number of individuals affected, (iv) the gravity of harm 
caused in case of improper handling of data protection rules and (v) the compliance with the 
privacy standards contained in applicable codes, policies, practices and regulations.
37  
                                                           
36 The list of privacy risks follows the PIA Framework (note 24), Annex III. 
37 PCPD Hong Kong (note 23), 2. 9 
Ideally, already at an early stage of a system’s development the efforts should be directed 
to a pro-active mitigation of risks through technical and organizational controls.
38 The better 
the precautionary measures realize the requested privacy objectives, the less likely problems 
will occur during the PIA process afterwards. Sometimes, PIA leaflets of data protection 
authorities contain valuable lists of possible measures for avoiding and mitigating  privacy 
risks.
39  
Risk assessment processes are known from many segments of the industry, mainly the 
high-technology and also the health fields. Lessons learned could be that risk assessments 
should be run at an early stage prior to the decision of definite ly implementing certain 
systems, that measures susceptible to malicious attacks should be avoided and applications 
already configured in a privacy friendly way should get a special preference.  
Generally looking, despite the difficulties, it is unavoidable   that in addition to the 
identification of the risks, a PIA process includes a relative quantification of the risks, i.e. the 
PIA operator must consider, as informed by the principle of proportionality  and under 
reasonable conditions, whether privacy risks are likely or not likely to realize in the processes 
executed in the business.
40 Such kind of risk assessment requires evaluating the applicable 
risks from a privacy perspective, encompassing the significance of the risk, the likelihood of 
its occurrence and the magnitude of the impact (low, medium, high) in case of its occurrence. 
A general important problem in the risk assessment context concerns the uncertainties 
and complexities inherent in risk analyses and the use of science (technology) policies. 
Usually, three aspects of scientific evaluation are taken into account:
41 (i) balancing categories 
of evidential reasoning, (ii) judging data and theories, and (iii) considering desiderata of 
rationality. The balancing categories concern how to weigh different  risk estimates; judging 
data encompasses the determination of quality of data and theories used, depending on 
statistical proper-ties, methodology, reliability, relevance and the level of scrutiny by the 
scientific community. Rationality is described as i ncluding conceptual clarity for all terms 
used  in  the  discourse,  logical  deduction,  methodological  rigor,  practicality,  ontological 
realism, epistemological reflection, and valuation. 
So far, experience with the application of PIA is still limited and knowledge must be 
gained in practice. The first review of the efforts related to the RFID PIA in November 2011, 
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Scientific Rationality in the Context of WTO/NAFTA Trade Rules, Risk Analysis 24 (2004), 461, 465. 10 
however,  gives at  least  some confidence that this  instrument  could  also be used in  other 
contexts.
42 
 
4. Revision of the EU Directive: Implementation of PIA 
In the course of the fundamental revision of the EU Directive on Data Protection 95/46
43 
which has been launched on January 25, 2012,
44 the EU Commission proposes to include a 
specific provision related to a data protection impact assessment into the future legal frame -
work in the newly drafted Data Protection Regulation.
45 Art. 33 para. 1 of the proposal reads 
as follows: 
 
“Where processing operations present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by 
virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes, the controller or the processor acting on the 
controller’s  behalf  shall  carry  out  an  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  envisaged  processing 
operations on the protection of personal data.” 
 
Thereafter,  the  proposed  provision  lists  specific  (data  protection)  risks  in  case  of  data 
processing (para. 2), followed by the conditions to be fulfilled by the impact assessment (para. 
3), namely the description of the envisaged processing operations and of the risks to the rights 
and  freedoms  of  data  subjects,  the  measures  envisaged  to  address  the  risks,  safeguards, 
security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data. Furthermore, 
addition-al provisions regulate the exchange of views on a PIA and the supervision by the 
competent authorities (paras 4-7). 
The  outcome  of  the  legislative  process  is  obviously  not  yet  known.  However,  the 
opposition  to  a  pre-final  draft  of  the  legal  framework  which  unintendedly  surfaced  in 
November 2011 to the public mainly concerned with regard to the form (Regulation instead of 
Directive), the introduction of new fundamental rights (such as the right to be forgotten) and 
                                                           
42  Sarah  Spiekermann,  The  RFID  PIA  –  developed  by  industry,  agreed  by  regulators,  in:  Privacy  Impact 
Assessment: Engaging Stakeholders in Protecting Privacy, ed. D. Wright/P. de Hert, 2012, 9, pre-publishing 
version, online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/documents/pia_spiekermann.pdf. 
43 European Parliament, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
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Data, 1995, online available at:  
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44 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
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(General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11/4 draft, 2012, online available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. 
45 A Regulation of the EU would be directly applicable in the Member States, in contrast to a Directive which 
has to be implemented in national law; nevertheless, the competence of the EU to release a Regulation in the 
data protection field is hotly debated and highly contested. 11 
the  extended  supervisory  regime  with  massive  powers  of  data  protection  surveillance 
authorities,  but  it  was  not  directed  against  the  principle  of  a  privacy  impact  assessment. 
Therefore,  the  fair  assumption  might  be  expressed  that  the  PIA  is  going  to  survive  the 
legislative process and will come into force, expectedly in 2014. 
 
5. Merits of PIA on the Way to Privacy-by-Design 
In principle, the privacy impact assessment has the regulatory benefit of encompassing two 
(perhaps  even  three)  regulatory  models:  Mainly  the  PIA  relies  on  the  self-regulatory 
approach,  but  based  on  a  “code-related”  notion  since  technology  plays  a  major  role.  In 
addition, compliance with the applicable legal framework is supervised by the authorities. 
Thereby, the strengths of each model can be combined and the weaknesses minimized. 
Since an international harmonization of data protection laws might be unlikely to happen 
during  this  decade,  the  merits  of  a  well-drafted  privacy  policy  by  the  concerned  entity 
(business,  government)  should  not  be  underestimated,  particularly  since  guidelines  and 
models are available and experiences have already be gained.
46 This assessment goes along 
with the fact that according to studies related to regulations governing the transborder flows 
of data an organizationally-based approach making data exporters accountabl e for ensuring 
the continued protection of personal data is the most viable tool for an appropriate privacy 
framework.
47 Obviously, adequate governing practices within the organization must be put in 
place and, even more, accountability measures are to be implemented.
48  
In order to improve the privacy legal framework it has been proposed by legal scholars to 
turn  to  a  “IT-security  legislation”  approach.
49  This  concept  encompasses  initiatives  that 
demand  the  establishment  of  reliable  IT-security  standards  which  should  protect  from 
unauthorized dis-closure of data; for example, new industry-based technological standards 
could introduce stringent safeguards. Thereby, technological “norms” would delineate a legal 
concept  in  which  a  broad  scale  of  privacy  problems  can  be  designated.
50  Such kind of 
approach has the advantage of leading to a concept of relational privacy taking into account 
                                                           
46 For further details see Rolf H. Weber, How Does Privacy Change in the Age of the Internet, In: Internet and 
Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, ed. C. Fuchs/ K. Boersma/A. Albrechtslund/M. 
Sandoval, 2012, 280. 
47 Kuner (note 8), 20 and 26. 
48 PIA Framework (note 24), 17 and 19. 
49 See Weber (note 46), 283 and 286. 
50 See Daniel J. Solove, A taxonomy of privacy, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154(3)(2006), 477 et 
seq.; Weber (note 46), 286. 12 
the specific demands of the manifold data subjects.
51 Furthermore, the implementation of an 
adequate PIA could eventually mitigate civil liability.
52 
From a technological angle a pro -active integration of privacy principles in a system’s 
design should be achieved in the form of privacy-by-design.
53 This term can be defined as a 
pro-active  engineering  and  management  approach  enabling  a  s elective  and  sustainable 
minimization  of  information  systems’  privacy  risks  through  technical  and  governance 
controls.
54   
 
The seven fundamental principles of privacy-by-design are:
55   
•  Proactive not Reactive; Preventive not Remedial; 
•  Privacy as the Default Setting; 
•  Privacy Embedded into Design; 
•  Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum; 
•  End-to-End Security – Full Lifecycle Protection; 
•  Visibility and Transparency – Keep it Open; 
•  Respect for User Privacy – Keep it User-Centric.  
 
A privacy-by-design framework should be composed of privacy-friendly architectures and 
technically  enforceable  default  policies  (i.e.  opt-in  settings)  or  data  scarcity  policies  (i.e. 
erasure or granularity policies), data portability and user access- and delete-rights.
56 The so far 
developed PIA concepts which now are even proposed as legislative action in the context of 
the revised EU Data Protection Regulation enables businesses to have privacy embedded in 
the system development life cycle and hence in organ izational processes by embracing the 
respective domain.
57   
 
                                                           
51 See Pieter Kleve/Richard De Mulder, Privacy protection and the right to information: a search of a new 
symbiosis in the information age, in: Cyberlaw & security privacy, ed. S. Kierkegaard, 2nd ed., 2007, 340. 
52  See  Raphaël  Gellert/Dariusz  Kloza,  Can  Privacy  Impact  Assessme nt  Mitigate  Civil  Liability?  A 
“Precautionous” Approach, IRIS 2012, conference proceedings.  
53 This term has been coined by Ann Cavoukian, Information & Privacy Commissioner Ontario, Canada, Privacy 
by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles, online available at:  
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf. 
54 See Sarah Spiekermann, The Challenges of Privacy -by-Design, Communications of the ACM, Viewpoint, 
forthcoming in 2012, 1. 
55 Cavoukian (note 52), 2. 
56 Spiekermann (note 53), 3-4. 
57 Spiekermann (note 53), 4. 
 13 
Summarizing, the Privacy Impact Assessment enables the concerned entities to design the 
conditions of the framework according to the individual needs. Since the risks for privacy and 
non-disclosure of personal data are different in not identical circumstances, the protection 
measures should also be different, i.e. technology as precautionary means should assist in 
trying  to  achieve  the  (at  least)  second-best  solution  for  the  implementation  of  the  data 
protection regime by a PIA. Insofar, privacy rules can be individualized and matched with the 
concrete needs in the given environment.   
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